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In Honduras, it can be estimated
that about 75-85% of hardwood
production, and 30-50% of pine production is clandestine.
Much of
the rest is 'legalised' - it is legal from the bureaucratic
viewpoint since it is accompanied by documents and permits,
but is produced fraudulently.
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Sometimes this is in a deliberate,
planned way (so-called ‘timber laundering’), and sometimes
because of the difficulty complying with all the legal requirements
(above all the high formal and informal payments associated with
many complex procedures). The following case and thematic studies
analyse the dynamics of the illegal logging production chains; the
legal, policy and institutional failures that are the fundamental
causes of the problem; and the impacts on governance, the economy,
civil society and the environment.
 
Three micro-level case studies
were carried out to document and analyse the illegal logging of
hardwood forest in Honduras, in the Paulaya Valley (Colón),
in the municipality of Dulce Nombre de Culmí (Olancho) and
in the department of Atlántida on the North Coast. These
sites were chosen to show a diversity of situations, including production
for the domestic and export markets. The studies record the roles
of the many illegal logging actors, including community leaders,
cooperatives and small producer groups, loggers and merchants (including
buyers for export companies), and government officials.
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There are important barriers to
legality in the forestry. These barriers include not only obstacles
to legality (which make compliance with the legal system more difficult
or impracticable), but also the inducements or stimuli to illegality.
The most relevant obstacles concern (i) confusion and insecurity
over land ownership (ii) failures of the legal system, such as those
leading to the high transaction costs associated with tiresome legal
and administrative procedures (for example, to obtain approval of
management plans) (iii) institutional weaknesses (iv) lack of information
(v) economic factors.

Important incentives to illegality
include (i) the limited risk of punishment for forest crimes (low
chance of discovery and ineffective legal penalties) (ii) the vulnerability
to corruption of public institutions (iii) the local context in
remote forest areas, characterised by low levels of governability
and formation of close links between a range of different illegal
activities.

Estimates of the loss of public
revenue (forestry and income taxes), and the waste of foreign aid
and public expenditure on forestry management, add up to 11-18 million
dollars each year. This is approximately the annual budget for AFE-COHDEFOR
($16 million in 2003) or the combined budgets of the National Institute
for Children and the Family ($6 million), the National Institute
for Women ($0.5 million), the National Foundation for Childhood
($3.2 million), and the National Bank for Provision of Basic Products
(BANASUPRO) ($5.1 million). Illegal logging erodes the livelihood
assets of the poor. In remote rural areas, it contributes to an
atmosphere of increasing illegality, in combination with other criminal
activities like drug smuggling, cattle stealing, traffic in forest
animals and arms, robberies, conflicts and violence, etc. It constitutes
a disincentive for sustainable forestry management efforts, significantly
diminishing its economic viability. It also contributes to the deterioration
of natural resources, with the accompanying loss of environmental
services.
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